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Recent Developments
DEFECTIVE DELINQUENTS - Courts Which Hear Defective Delinquent Proceedings Have No Authority To Grant New
Trials. Austin v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 245 Md. 206, 225
A.2d 466 (1967) and Creswell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 1
Md. App. 8, 226 A.2d 158 (1967). In Austin, the defendant was
tried on charges of assault with the intent to rape and simple assault.
Found guilty of the lesser charge, he was sentenced to a term of ten
years in the penitentiary from which he was subsequently transported
to Patuxent Institution for examination to determine whether he was
a "defective delinquent" within the meaning of Article 31B of the
Maryland Code.' The examining committee concluded that he was a
defective delinquent and recommended that he be committed to Patuxent.2 At the hearing, however, the jury found that he was not a
defective delinquent. The state's motion for a new trial on the ground
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence was granted
over the defendant's motion ne recipiatur. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in reversing this order, held that courts in defective delinquent proceedings are limited by the procedures of the statute from
which they derive their jurisdiction and, in the absence of a new trial
provision, the court may not grant one to the state.
In the Creswell case, the defendant had been found to be a defective delinquent on March 17, 1959, and again at a rehearing on
December 20, 1961. At his third hearing, January 25, 1966, the jury
found that he was still a defective delinquent.' On January 28, 1966,
defendant's attorney filed a motion for judgment NOV or, in the
alternative, for a new trial. These motions were denied on March 7,
1966. On April 6, 1966, defendant's attorney filed application for
leave to appeal the order of January 25, 1966. Since this application
1. A "defective delinquent" is defined in MD. CoM ANN. art. 31B, § 5 (1957) as:
... [A]n individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and
who is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional imbalance,
or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require
such confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably
safe for society to terminate the confinement.
2. MD. COD4 ANN. art. 31B, § 7 (1957) states:
Any such examination shall be made by at least three persons on behalf of the
institution for defective delinquents, one of whom shall be a medical physician,
one a psychiatrist, and one a psychologist ....
On the basis of all the assembled
information, plus their own personal examination of the said person, they shall
determine whether, in their opinion, or in the opinion of a majority of them, the
said person is or is not a defective delinquent
3. According to MD. Conn ANN. art. 31B, § 10 (1957), defective delinquents are
entitled to review of their status after they have been confined to Patuxent for two
years. Subsequent reviews are permitted after three years from the date of the
last hearing.
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was not made within thirty days of the order appealed from,4 the only
question for the consideration of the Court of Special Appeals was
what effect, if any, the filing of motions for judgment NOV or new
trial had on the time limit for filing for leave to appeal. Adhering to
the decision in the Austin case, the court concluded that there was no
distinction between the finding that defendant is or is not a defective
delinquent; it therefore held that since the lower court had no authority
to entertain new trial motions on the basis of Austin, the time limit
for filing applications for leave to appeal is not affected by them. Consequently, since the application was not filed within the requisite thirty
days of January 25, 1966, it was denied.
The specific problem presented by these two cases is whether the
courts which hear defective delinquent proceedings have the power to
grant new trials. This narrow question indirectly raises a much broader
issue involving the entire defective delinquent act. The courts decided
these cases by invoking the well-settled rule that when courts proceed
under special statutes, their power and authority is limited to that
clearly and specifically conferred on them by the statute.' Since the
defective delinquent act contains no provision for a new trial,6 the
courts below had no authority to consider such motions. In reaching
the Austin decision, the court relies in part on the earlier decision of
Bullock v. State,7 which held that a defendant in a defective delinquent
proceeding was not entitled to the right of removal from one court to
another in ,the absence of a provision in the statute. These precedents
are sound authority for the conclusions that courts which hear defective delinquent proceedings do not have the power to grant new trials.
There may, however, be a more compelling reason for reaching the
same conclusion.
The defective delinquent law is a new and different approach to
the problems of crime and recidivism.' The use of this act as a criminal
remedy, however, is probably constitutionally impermissible in view of
the rigid safeguards required in criminal proceedings.9 Presumably,
4. MD. Cone ANN. art. 31B, § 11 (1957):
From any order issued under the provisions of Section 9 or Section 10, within
thirty (30) days after the passage of the order, application may be made to the
Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal from the order.
5. This proposition was clearly articulated in Kinnear v. Lee, 28 Md. 488, 489
(1868), which dealt with the question of appeal to one court from another under the

provisions of a special statute: ".

.

. [T]he courts do not proceed according to the

forms of the common law or under their usual or general jurisdiction, but in the
exercise of a special statute to be strictly followed." See also Lambson v. Director
of the Patuxent Institution, 231 Md. 656, 191 A.2d 443 (1962) (no provision for
re-evaluation when person found not defective delinquent) ; Simpler v. State, 223 Md.
456, 165 A.2d 464 (1960) ; Switkes v. John McShain, Inc., 202 Md. 340, 96 A.2d 617
(1953); Close v. Southern Maryland Agricultural Assoc., 134 Md. 629, 108 A.
209 (1919).
6. The Act makes provision, among others, for examination, requests for examination, hearings, sentence, review, and appeal. Significantly, there is no provision for
new trial.
7. 230 Md. 280, 186 A.2d 888 (1962).
8. "With this humanitarian and progressive approach to the problem, no person
who has deplored the inadequacies of conventional penological practices can complain." Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 1964).
9. Some of the principal objections are: first, since all of the Patuxent psychiatrists cannot take time to testify personally at every trial, experts are permitted to
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for this reason, the defective delinquent proceeding has been termed
civil rather than criminal.1x This is important because ". . . [O]nly
if the statute is regulatory can the precise criminal procedures required
to uphold the constitutionality of a penal statute be dispensed with."11
While this civil designation avoids many problems, it tends to create
others. Since in any civil action in which the state would merely be
a party, it would normally be entitled to a new trial just as any other
party. In an area as new and constitutionally undefined as defective
delinquency, however, granting a new trial to the state could easily go
beyond the limits to which the courts would be willing to extend this

arguably artificial civil classification and might precipitate a ruling that
the act is unconstitutional as violative of the protection against double
jeopardy. In this light, a source of motivation for the court in Austin
is clear. 2 By denying the state the right to a new trial, the defective
delinquent law is insulated to some degree from a possible avenue
of attack. The situation is not quite the same, however, when, as in
Creswell, the defendant requests the new trial instead of the state.
When the court says, "We find no distinction in this regard whether
the finding is that the defendant is not a defective delinquent or is a
defective delinquent, ' 1 1 it ignores, perhaps by choice, these unarticutestify over objection as to an opinion of defective delinquency based in part on background hearsay matters; second, the defective delinquent procedure permits experts
to express their opinions on the ultimate issue before the jury; that is, whether the
inmate is a defective delinquent within the meaning of the act; third, this procedure
provides the civil measure of proof, greater weight of the evidence, rather than the
criminal rule of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and fourth, the defective delinquent
is given an indeterminate sentence.
10. The criterion for a determination of whether an act is civil or criminal in
nature seems to be whether it is regulatory or penal in character. See Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Maryland Court of Appeals found

this act to be civil in Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 513, 121 A.2d 698, 703 (1956) :

In character the Act is not unlike statutes providing for a civil inquiry into the
sanity of a person. This character is not altered by the fact that it deals only
with persons who have demonstrated criminal tendencies resulting in criminal
convictions, nor by the fact that it utilizes some of the traditional methods of
adjudication and review that have been developed in the criminal law.
This finding was reviewed in Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16,
221 A.2d 397 (1966), when the constitutionality of the act was affirmed. The court
examined the legislative history of the act and concluded that it:
. . . clearly demonstrates that its [the act's] sole objective and purpose was not
penal but an effort to segregate a known group of mentally disordered people who
are found guilty of criminal acts, by confining them in an institution ... in a sole
effort to protect society and provide treatment. . . Id. at 38, 221 A.2d at 410.
The court also based its agreement with Eggleston's civil classification on the face
of the act itself:
[Affirmative restraint] is provided only because it is deemed best for the protection of society and for the protection and treatment of the individual. . . . Historically, this type of sanction or restraint . . . has not been regarded as punishment, but regulatory ....
Id. at 39, 221 A.2d at 410-11.
The court also relies by analogy on the civil classification of sexual psychopath laws
in those jurisdictions which have them. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350 (1952).
11. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 37, 221 A.2d 397,
409 (1966).
12. This motivation was obviously a factor in this decision, as indicated by the
statement at the end of the opinion. 245 Md. at 212, 225 A.2d at 470.
Nor do we reach the other subsidiary questions as to whether the granting of a
new trial was a violation of the rule against double jeopardy, a denial of due
process of law, or a denial of the right of the defendant to have the jury judge
the law as well as the facts.
13. 1 Md. App. at 10, 226 A.2d at 159.
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lated considerations which influenced the Austin court. Although the
language of the Austin decision may leave the Creswell court no
choice,' 4 it should be noted that the same considerations which might
have motivated the former decision can be contended not to be applicable when the question is whether a new trial may be granted to the
defendant. In any event, these decisions are certainly defensible, and
the well-established doctrine requiring authority to be specifically delegated by statute was a convenient vehicle for the courts in these cases
to dispose of the questions presented.

EVIDENCE - Admissibility Of A Non-Violated Statute As
Evidence Of Negligence. Curtis v. District of Columbia, 363 F.2d
973 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Plaintiff, while walking over a vault covering,
the hinges of which protruded one inch above the level of the sidewalk,
tripped, fell, and was injured. As part of the plaintiff's proof of negligence, he offered in evidence a District of Columbia Building Code
section which provided that vault covers "shall be so constructed as to
be flush with the pavement. . . ."' Defendant, whose vault covering
did not conform to that requirement, objected to the admission of the
code section on the grounds that it was enacted after his vault had
been constructed and that the ordinance was not retroactive, but prospective only. The court agreed with the defendant in part by finding
that the vault had been built prior to the enactment of the ordinance
and that the ordinance was prospective only; however, the court ruled
in a two-to-one decision that the ordinance could still be admitted by
the plaintiff to show a standard of care by which to appraise the defendant's actions.'
The use of a violated statute as evidence of a breach of duty has
become generally accepted in the United States within the last thirty
14. While the strict holding of the Austin case is only that the lower courts
may not grant new trials to the state, the implications of the court's dictum with
respect to defendants are not entirely clear. The opinion at one point states:
[I]t is apparent that the court, in the exercise of the special jurisdiction conferred on it by the statute, was required to follow the only course of action
prescribed by the statute when, as here, the defendant was found not to be a
defective delinquent.
In the same paragraph the court also said, "If new trials are to be granted in defective
delinquent proceedings, the Legislature, not the Courts, should provide for them."
245 Md. at 212, 225 A.2d at 469.
In view of the ambiguity between Austin's emphasis on the word "not" and
the pronouncement that the legislature should provide new trials, the Creswell court
might have been able to grant the defendant a new trial in spite of the Austin ruling,
without endangering the defective delinquent act.
1. D.C. BUILDING COD, art. 406-22(h) (1951).
2. In the District of Columbia, an ordinance is to be given the same effect as if
it were an Act of Congress. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-228 (1966). Usually the violation
of a statute is distinguished from the violation of an ordinance because, unlike the
statute which can only be attacked on constitutional grounds, an ordinance can be
attacked by its violator on grounds that it is outside of the scope of the power of the
legislative body which passed it. See Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. Riv. 21, 39 (1949).
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years.' The statute is employed by the court as a convenient yardstick
for determining the otherwise difficult problem of what "ordinary care
exercised by a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances" would
have been.4 In other common law countries, there seems to be an active
debate with respect to the proper use of a violated statute as evidence
of negligence.' Those in favor of using statutes as evidence argue that
the criminal law is an appropriate measure of conduct because by its
very nature a criminal statute gives warning of improper conduct to
the public. Also they indicate that the public policy and its basis can
easily be ascertained from the legislative history of the statute and that
judicial expediency at trial is provided by the use of the statutory
standard of conduct. Critics of the use of statutes as evidence point
out that civil liability is not always an appropriate consequence for the
violation of the statute, especially when there is a minor infraction of
a petty regulation. They say, moreover, that many statutes are passed
with little fanfare, thus tending to negate any inference that adequate
warning is given to the public. Finally they argue that the criminal
law may impose duties where none existed at common law and that
criminal statutes are sometimes needlessly severe in their treatment of
wrongdoers. All agree, however, that the statute should not be used
blindly. As Morris indicates, "ultimately the justification of any liability, criminal or civil, depends on the service it performs in advancing
sound policy." 6
The plaintiff, in order to introduce the statute into evidence, must
show that he is among the class of people that the statute was intended to protect and that the harm suffered was that which the
statute was intended to prevent.7 In the present case, the harm that
the D. C. Building Code attempted to prevent was apparently the injury to pedestrians caused by non-flush vault covers constructed after
the enactment of the Code, not from vault covers installed prior to the
Code's enactment. Having admitted the statute, some states take the
position that the violation constitutes negligence per se, 8 in that once

3. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 35 (3d ed. 1964) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
or TORTS § 285, 286 (1965) ; James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident
Cases, 11 LA. L. Rtv. 95 (1950); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal
Legislation, 16 MINN. L. RIv. 361 (1932); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes
in Negligence Actions, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 21 (1949) ; Morris, The Relation of
Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. Rzv. 453 (1933) ; Thayer, Public
Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1914) ; Note, Breach of Statutory
Duty As Negligence in New York, 15 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 246 (1949).
4. The plaintiff must still prove the other acknowledged elements of a negligence action - that the defendant's acts proximately caused the plaintiff's injury and
that the plaintiff suffered damages.
5. See Alexander, Legislation and the Standard of Care in Negligence, 42
CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [CAN. BAR Ryv.] 243 (1964) ; Fricke, The Juridical Nature
of the Action Upon the Statute, 76 LAW QUARTERLY REviEw 240 (1960); Linden,
Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance, 44 CAN. BAR Rrv. 25 (1966).
6. Morris, supra note 2, at 22.
7. Akins v. County of Sonoma, 55 Cal. Rptr. 785 (Ct. App. 1966). See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Younker Bros., Inc., 249 Iowa 923, 89 N.W.2d 858 (1958) ; Zanette Bus
Line v. Logan, 400 P.2d 482 (Wyo. 1965). See also W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 3,
at 193-98. For a complete discussion of the use of a violated statute in an auto negligence context, see Note, Liability For Negligence in Parking - Effect of Statute,
11 MD. L. REv. 51 (1950).
8. See, e.g., Eddy v. Oklahoma Hotel Building Co., 228 F.2d 106 (10th Cir.
1955); Richardson v. El Paso Consol. Gold Mining Co., 51 Colo. 440, 118 P. 982
(1911). See also Annot., 132 A.L.R. 863, 866 (1941).
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the violation is shown, the defendant is negligent as a matter of law
and liable for the injuries proximately caused by his non-compliance
with the statute. Other states hold that the violation creates only a
rebuttable presumption of negligence, 9 while a few others take the
position that the violation is merely evidence which the jury can accept
or reject.'0
In most cases, a statute is sought to be introduced when it has
been violated. The present case is unusual ,because the statute was
offered as evidence of negligence although admittedly it had not been
violated. In this situation, courts have had difficulty in applying the
rationale for admitting a statute. One argument made for inclusion has
been stated in Edmonds, Inc. v. Vojka." In that case, the court felt
that the statute should be admitted as evidence for a "standard of
accepted architectural practice" by which the court could determine
whether the defendant exercised due care in maintaining a stairway
built prior to the enactment of the statute; the statute in that case did
not apply on its face -tothe defendant because it was prospective in its
nature, but had been in effect for more than ,ten years. 12 Where the
situation is closely similar to the one covered by the statute, some commentators have argued for admission. 8 However, the better arguments are those against admitting a non-violated statute because admission by the courts in such a situation is in essence a usurpation of the
legislative function by the resulting application of the statute to facts
which the legislature did not intend the statute to cover. Such a practice will also place defendants in a highly paradoxical situation in that
they must either conform to the statutory standard, which the statute
does not require,
or risk being held liable for negligence for failing
14
to conform.

9. The presumption of negligence doctrine has been applied only in auto negligence actions. See, e.g., Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581,
177 P.2d 279 (1947) ; Nadeau v. Perkins, 135 Me. 215, 193 A. 877 (1937) ; Shearer
v. DeShon, 240 S.C. 472, 126 S.E.2d 514 (1962) ; Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141
A. 593 (1928).
10. See, e.g., Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. J. A. Jones Const. Co., 325 F.2d 605 (8th
Cir. 1963) ; Gill v. Whiteside-Henby Drug Co., 197 Ark. 425, 122 S.W.2d 597 (1938) ;
Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965). See also Annot., 132
A.L.R. 863, 868 (1941) ; Hardman v. Ford Motor Co., 70 N.J. Super. 275, 175 A.2d
455 (Super. Ct. 1961).
11. 332 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1964). It should be noted that this is the same court
which decided the principal case. While not giving the effect of stare decisis to
Edmonds, the majority opinion in the principal case seems to depend heavily on
its reasoning.
12. Id. at 311.
13. See James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA.
L. Rtv. 95, 115 (1950), reprinted in 2 F. HARER & F. JAmts, TORTS § 17.6 (1956),

indicating rhetorically that "[i]f there has been no breach because the statute does
not cover the precise situation before the court, may it not, nevertheless, be some
evidence of the proper standard in a sufficiently analogous situation?" It should be
noted that much of the author's argument is weakened by his use of the rhetorical
question. Cf. Chipchase v. British Titan Products Co., Ltd., [1956] 1 Q.B. 545 (C.A.),
where the court refused to apply a scaffolding safety statute concerning the proper

width of the scaffold where the scaffolding in question was six inches lower than the
height (six feet, six inches) at which the statute began to apply.
14. See the dissent by Judge Prettyman in Curtis v. District of Columbia, 363
F.2d 973, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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GARNISHMENT-Bank's Right To Set-Off Note Of Depositor
Against Creditor's Claim For Deposits Exists At Any Time Prior
To Trial. Victor R. Messall & Robert E. Howe v. Suburban Trust
Co., 244 Md. 502, 224 A.2d 419 (1966). Plaintiff creditors obtained
a judgment against their debtor and on July 29, 1964 attached his
account at defendant bank. On the day of the attachment the bank
held the debtor's unsecured promissory note, payable in installments
and then current. This note contained an acceleration clause to be
invoked, at the option of the holder, upon non-payment of any installment. The day after attachment the bank made entries setting-off the
balance of the note against the debtor's deposits. It then returned the
note to the debtor marked paid and filed its answer as garnishee, confessing only the remainder of the deposits. Subsequently the bank
determined that it had erred by setting-off a debt not yet due.1 On
December 22, it notified the debtor by letter that the previous set-off
had been invalid and that the note was still in effect, further, if all
installments due through December 25th were not paid by January
4, 1965, the bank stated it would invoke its option to accelerate and
consider the entire balance due. No response was received from the
debtor, and when the case came to trial more than ten months after
the date of attachment, the bank claimed a set-off. The creditors had
not been informed of the reinstitution of the note or of its acceleration, 2
1. At trial the bank admitted that its act had been improper. In the absence
of special considerations, a bank may not set-off an unnatured debt of its depositor
against his general deposits. State Nat'l Bank v. Towns, 36 Ala. App. 677, 62 So. 2d

606 (1953); First Nat'l Bank v. Minge, 186 Ala. 405, 64 So. 957 (1914); Holloway
v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Idaho 746, 265 P. 699 (1928) ; cf. McGerr v. Beals, 180 Neb.
767, 145 N.W.2d 579 (1966). Such a set-off has been allowed with the consent or
acquiescence of the depositor, but not after garnishment. Birmingham Nat'l Bank v.
Mayer, 104 Ala. 634, 16 So. 520 (1894) ; Samuels v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
140 Misc. 744, 251 N.Y.S. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
2. Had the note been kept current, the bank would not have been able to set it off
against the garnished deposits. As pointed out in Judge Barnes' dissent, in view of the
Maryland rule allowing the set-off of any debts which mature before trial, it would
have been in the garnishor's best financial interest to assume payment of the debtor's
installments and thus save to himself the greater amount of the garnished account.
No case has been discovered establishing a right in the garnishor to receive
notice of an intention to accelerate or to assume payments for his debtor. Indeed,
it is generally accepted that a debtor, himself, need not be given notice of acceleration,
if acceleration is effected in some other way. Hendron v. Bolander, 101 Colo. 414,
74 P.2d 706 (1937) (institution of foreclosure proceedings and notice thereof suffident) ; Santini v. Fritkin, 240 Md. 542, 214 A.2d 578 (1965) (foreclosure of deed of
trust sufficient) ; Carmichael v. Rice, 49 N.M. 114, 158 P.2d 290 (1945) (dictum that
bringing suit or entry on books of account sufficient) ; Gold v. Vanden Brul, 28 Misc.
2d 644, 211 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1961) (verification of mortgage foreclosure complaint
sufficient). But it would seem, as Judge Barnes points out, that, since the garnishee
elected to effect acceleration by giving notice, he should have given notice to the
garnishor, as the garnishor stands in the shoes of the debtor and is subrogated to
his rights against the garnishee. Cf. Sandoval v. Clenoweth, 2 Ariz. App. 553, 410
P.2d 671 (1966); Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 207 Md. 225, 114 A.2d 45 (1955);
Polzin v. Merila, 258 Minn. 93, 103 N.W.2d 198 (1960); Appel Vending Co. v. 1601
Corp., 204 Pa. Super. 243, 203 A.2d 812 (1964). The majority opinion makes much
of the fact that the garnishor's rights against the garnishee cannot rise above those
of the debtor against the garnishee, but, as pointed out by the dissent, the garnishor's
rights are certainly no less than those of the debtor. Indeed, the majority impliedly
admitted this by stating, "The liability of the garnishee to the attaching creditor in
respect of property or credits in his hands is determined ordinarily by what his
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and the debtor was apparently solvent from the date of the attachment
through the date of the trial.3
The lower court found for the garnishee bank and allowed a set-off
of the entire amount still due on the note. On appeal the Court of
Appeals of Maryland affirmed, citing President & Directors of the
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Franklin Bank4 as establishing that
a garnishee may set-off a debt existent at attachment and falling due
at any time before trial. The court stated that, though contrary to the
rule in other jurisdictions, the Maryland rule had been established in
Franklin Bank, had been followed ever since, and would be followed
in the instant case. The court went on to hold that the bank's letter
of December 22 was sufficient to accelerate maturity of the note and
that the fact that the note was matured by acceleration would not
prevent a set-off. The court further stated that the garnishee's improper set-off in July was not prejudicial to the creditors and would
not prevent a later set-off.
In a majority of states, a bank may set-off an indebtedness of its
depositor against his garnished account when the indebtedness is in
existence at the time of attachment and is then due.5 These courts
do not allow the set-off of a debt acquired after attachment or of a
debt in existence at the time of attachment but not yet due.6 Other
accountability to the debtor would be if the debtor were in fact suing him." 244 Md.
at 506, 224 A.2d at 421.
The majority ruled that notice to the garnishor was not required because, if
the garnishor had paid any installments for the debtor, he would have been obligated
to pay off the entire debt and thus he would have been in the same position as he
was after set-off. There seems to be no precedent for this statement, and no authority
was cited by the majority.
3. In a majority of jurisdictions the insolvency of a debtor is considered sufficient ground to allow a garnishee to set-off an unmatured debt. Schuler v. Israel,
120 U.S. 506 (1887); Wunderlich v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 109 Minn. 468, 124
N.W. 223 (1910) ; 34 Ky. L.J. 302 (1946). Contra, Appleton v. National Park Bank,
211 App. Div. 708, 208 N.Y.S. 228 (1925), aff'd, 241 N.Y. 561, 150 N.E. 555 (1925) ;
Oatman v. Batavian Bank, 77 Wis. 501. 46 N.W. 881 (1890). Set-off of an unmatured debt is also allowed in some jurisdictions when the debtor is a non-resident.
Levin v. First Nat'l Bank, 91 Ga. App. 873, 87 S.E.2d 360 (1955). Contra, Stockyards
Nat'l Bank v. Presnall, 109 Tex. 32, 194 S.W. 384 (1917).
4. 31 Md. 404 (1869).
5. Walters v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 P.2d 983 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. 1936); Holloway v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Idaho 746, 265 P. 699 (1928);
cf. Bray v. Ed Willey & Son, 239 Ark. 855, 395 S.W.2d 342 (1965) (garnishee
not bank); Mattek v. Hoffmann, 272 Wis. 503, 76 N.W.2d 300 (1956) (garnishee
not bank). The right of a garnishee to set-off is not generally affected by the fact
that the garnishee is a bank or that the debt garnished is a bank account.
6. First Nat'l Bank v. Minge, 186 Ala. 405, 64 So. 957 (1914); Brown v.
Maguire's Real Estate Agency, 101 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1937), rev'd on other grounds,
343 Mo. 336, 121 S.W.2d 754 (1938); Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Presnall, 109 Tex.
32, 194 S.W. 384 (1917); cf. Mattek v. Hoffmann, 272 Wis. 503, 76 N.W.2d 300
(1956) (garnishee not bank). Under the majority view there are exceptions where
unmatured debts may be set-off. Macon Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 170 Ga. 332, 153 S.E. 4
(1930) (agreement that deposit was collateral for the debt) ; Compare Samuel v.
Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 140 Misc. 744, 251 N.Y.S. 671 (1931) (agreement
that a lien on deposit unavailing); Adolph Bergman Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaul,
318 Pa. 126, 178 A. 140 (1935) (demand notes). As a rule, special deposits may
not be set-off. Cf. Sherberg v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Colo. 407, 222 P.2d 782 (1950)
(not garnishment) ; Iselin v. Farrow, 115 Okla. 218, 242 P. 528 (1925) (not garnishment). A bank may waive its right to set-off. Walters v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 9 Cal. 2d 46, 69 P.2d 839 (1937) (funds paid to debtor) ; First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lundquist, 172 Okla. 453, 45 P.2d 524 (1935)
(funds
transferred from garnished account to another from which depositor allowed to draw) ;
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states allow set-off when a debt not due upon attachment becomes due
before the garnishee bank files its answer.7 One state, by statute, allows
set-off of unmatured debts.'
The Maryland rule today is unique. As stated in Franklin Bank
the rule was unclear. Dicta in that case seemed in accord with the
majority view: "The right of condemnation must, therefore, be subject to any such right of set-off or discharge existing at the time of
garnishment, as would be available to the garnishee if he were sued
by the defendant."9 But the holding of the case on its facts was clearly
to the contrary. The garnishee bank was allowed to set-off its depositor's debt against the attached account where the debt was not due
upon attachment but became due automatically by its terms before
trial. As pointed out by Judge Barnes in his dissent in the instant
case, even if restricted to its facts, the ruling of Franklin Bank was
unfortunate because it would allow a garnishee to defeat the claim of
a garnishor by delay of trial.
The court in FranklinBank did seek to restrict the right to set-off
to a certain extent. The court stated that a garnishee would not be
allowed to extend his right of set-off ".

.

. to any matter originating

by the action of the garnishee subsequent to garnishment, as otherwise it would be in the power of the garnishee in a majority of cases
to defeat the right of condemnation, which should not, by any means,
be allowed."' The meaning of this statement is not clear. The court
surely meant at least to forbid the set-off of indebtedness not existing
at attachment but acquired subsequently. It may, however, have meant
to go further and forbid also the set-off of indebtedness existing at
attachment but matured before trial by conduct of the garnishee outside of his existing contract rights; or, the court may have meant to go
still further and forbid also the set-off of indebtedness matured before
trial by any conduct of the garnishee."
Whatever the meaning of this dictum in Franklin Bank, the court
in Messall has clearly extended the rule beyond the facts of the former
case. Whereas in the former case the set-off debt matured automatically before trial, in the instant case the debt was matured by
the garnishee's affirmative exercise of his option to accelerate upon
default by the debtor. Where the holding of Franklin Bank placed a
premium upon delay of trial, the extension in Messall has opened the
door to frustration of a garnishor's rights by collusion between garnishee and debtor.
Prudential Loan & Trust Co. v. Metzler, 66 Ore. 224, 133 P. 1191 (1913) (funds paid
to depositor); Holt's Sporting Goods Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 400 S.W.2d 943
(Tex. 1966) (depositor allowed to continue installment payments). But cf. Bray v.
Ed Willey & Son, 239 Ark. 855, 395 S.W.2d 342 (1965)
(garnishee not bank);
Adair-Levert, Inc. v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 29 S.E.2d 323 (Ga. 1944) (garnishee
not bank). See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 700 (1958) (set-off of other garnished
debts) ; Annot., 106 A.L.R. 62 (1937); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1268 (1937) (set-off of
garnished bank accounts).
7. Lannon v. Walter, 149 Mass. 14, 20 N.E. 196 (1889) ; cf. Estridge v. Janko,
96 Ga. App. 246, 99 S.E.2d 682 (1957) (garnishee not bank).
8. E.g., Levinson v. Home Bank & Trust Co., 337 Ill. 241, 169 N.E. 193 (1929).
9. 31 Md. 404, 412 (1869) (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 413.
11. This is the interpretation urged by Judge Barnes in his dissent.
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The court in Messall has, perhaps unknowingly, carried the rule to
even more unfortunate limits. The majority apparently felt that the
note was matured solely by the exercise of a pre-existing contract
right12 to accelerate and that the bank's premature attempt to set-off
was a harmless error. But in fact, the default of the debtor which
created the opportunity to accelerate was caused by the conduct of the
garnishee. The premature attempt to accelerate and the return of the
note marked paid presumably caused the debtor to stop further payment. Since the debtor was solvent, there is no reason to presume
that regular installments would not have been paid after garnishment.
It would be unreasonable, however, to expect the debtor to pay five
monthly installments totaling $2,000 within a period of two weeks.
The garnishor, who also had an interest in keeping the note current,
was not informed of the reinstitution of the note or of the threat to
accelerate. Thus the garnishee's premature set-off and subsequent inequitable demand for payment caused the note to mature, and certainly
this should not have been considered by the court as merely the exercise of a preexisting contract right. Under the holding of the Messall
case on its facts, a future garnishee might succeed in defeating the
rights of a garnishor by intentionally making a set-off known by him
to be premature in order to lure a solvent debtor into default.
Garnishment is a technique designed to assist a creditor in collecting debts owed him by his debtor. Through this device a creditor seeks
to prevent the dissipation of a debtor's assets until they can be collected. Though its limits are unclear, the statement of the court in
Franklin Bank was clearly made to prevent future garnishees from
defeating the rights of garnishors by acts subsequent to garnishment.
The underlying ethical basis of this statement would seem to apply
equally to the acquisition or acceleration of debts and particularly to
the acceleration of debts where default has been caused by conduct of
the garnishee. By its decision in the Messall case, the court has clearly
extended the rule of Franklin Bank and has adopted a rule which could
easily be used to frustrate the useful device of garnishment through
delay, collusion, and fraud. Moreover, there seems to be no valid reason (and none is offered by the majority) for favoring a garnishee
in this manner when his debtor is solvent.
The Messall decision indicates the court of appeals has adopted
a position contrary to the weight of authority on one of the other issues
presented also. Prior to the instant case Maryland had asserted its
agreement'$ with the general rule of other states that, if a promissory
note contains a provision for acceleration of its maturity at the option
of the holder upon a condition subsequent, the holder must take some
12. "If by the exercise of any preexisting bona fide contract right that account-

ability has been removed or lessened prior to trial, the garnishee's liability to the
attaching creditor is correspondingly affected." 244 Md. at 506, 224 A.2d at 421.
13. Santini v. Fritkin, 240 Md. 542, 214 A.2d 578 (1965). In this case the foreclosure of a deed of trust securing a note and the application of the proceeds of the
sale to the balance due on the note was held sufficient affirmative action to effect
acceleration. In this ruling the Maryland court followed the rule of a majority of
states: United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Holman, 177 Neb. 682, 130 N.W.2d 593 (1964) ;
Gold v. Vanden Brul, 28 Misc. 2d 644, 211 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1961) ; and its own former
decision, Gerber v. Karr, 231 Md. 180, 189 A.2d 353 (1963).
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affirmative action evidencing his election to take advantage of the

provision, and, until he does so, the provision will not operate. 1 4 In
the instant case the court held that notification by the holder of a
note of an intention to accelerate in the future is sufficient affirmative
action to effect acceleration. In so doing, the court has placed itself
in opposition to most jurisdictions that have spoken on the subject.
Often courts have held a letter from a creditor to a debtor giving
notice of a present election to accelerate to be sufficient to effect acceleration. 15 But a letter stating or implying an intention to accelerate a
note in the event of non-payment by a future date, where there is
no waiver of notice provision in the note, has generally been held
insufficient to effect acceleration. 6 Though notice to a debtor is often
accepted as sufficient to effect acceleration, 17 such notice must be clear
and definite enough to show that it is an unequivocal election to declare the balance of the note due immediately and is not just a threat
or declaration of intention to declare the debt due at a future time.1 8
According to the rule in other states, a mere declaration of intention
must be followed by some affirmative act to enforce the declared intention in order to effect acceleration.' 9
In the instant case the letter of December 22 exhibited only an intention to accelerate at a future date and was followed by no further
action indicating the bank would enforce its declared intention. Thus
in other jurisdictions the note would probably have been considered
unmatured even at trial, and set-off of the unmatured note would have
been denied. But the majority of the Maryland court, without support
in Maryland precedent and without explanation, held that the note had
been effectively accelerated and thus could be set-off. In view of its
prior statements on the issue one would have expected the court to
have explained its deviation from a rule apparently adopted almost
20
universally elsewhere.

It has been held that an equitable defense can be invoked to prevent
acceleration of a note when default has been occasioned by inequitable
14. Capital City Motors, Inc. v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 363 S.W.2d 575 (Mo.
1962) ; Carmichael v. Rice, 49 N.M. 114, 158 P.2d 290 (1945), 2 BAYLOR L. REv. 460
(1950); Shoenterprise Corp. v. Willingham, 258 N.C. 36, 127 S.E.2d 767 (1962).
15. E.g., United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Holman, 177 Neb. 682, 130 N.W.2d 593
(1964); Thompson v. Willson, 183 Misc. 949, 51 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1944).
16. E.g., Wolfley v. Wooten, 220 Mo. App. 668, 293 S.W. 73 (1927); Union
Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 169 Okla. 572, 38 P.2d 26 (1934).
17. E.g., Stalder v. Riverside Groves & Water Co., 167 Cal. 560, 140 P. 252
(1914) ; Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 190 S.E. 564 (1937).
18. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 169 Okla. 572, 38 P.2d 26 (1934).
19. Id.
20.
With regard to a promissory note which contains a provision accelerating
its maturity at the option of the holder . . . the applicable rule of law is that
the holder must take some affirmative action which indicates an election to take

advantage of the acceleration provision ....
When, however, the holder takes
positive action indicating that he has elected to exercise the option, then the full
amount of the unpaid balance of principal and interest becomes immediately
due and payable. ...
Santini v. Fritkin, 240 Md. 542, 544-45, 214 A.2d 578, 580 (1965) (emphasis added).
If the note contains a provision for acceleration without notice there must still be
affirmative action to exercise the option but it need not be such as to communicate the
election to the maker, Wolfley v. Wooten, 220 Mo. App. 668, 293 S.W. 73 (1927)
Carmichael v. Rice, 49 N.M. 114, 158 P.2d 290 (1945).
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conduct of the holder. 2 1 In the Messall case it was the improper act of
the bank in prematurely setting-off the debtor's deposits against his
unmatured debt which prevented the debtor or the garnishor from continuing to pay installments. Thus, even if it be accepted in Maryland
that the affirmative action required of the holder to effect acceleration
was present, it would appear that the court should have deemed the
acceleration invalid because of the impropriety of the holder's conduct in
causing default and thereby denied the set-off for lack of a matured debt.

NEW TRIAL - Rebuke Of Counsel Held Ground For New
Trial In Criminal Case Tried Without A Jury. State v. Gionfriddo,
154 Conn. 90, 221 A.2d 851 (1966). Defendant was charged with a
total of seven counts of the crimes of rape, indecent assault, and risking impairment of the morals of a minor. Four girls were involved,
ranging in age from fourteen to sixteen years. All were residents of
a church-run Children's Home and were close friends. The offenses
were allegedly committed over a seven-month period from July, 1963
to January, 1964, while each girl was babysitting with defendant's
step-children. Although it was claimed that extreme force was employed in raping two of the girls, neither made any outcry nor bore
any evidence of violence on her person or clothing. The girls did not
disclose these incidents to one another or report them to the officials
of the Home. On the contrary, they continued to maintain an amicable
relationship with both the defendant and his wife. In February, 1964,
after one of the girls had had her 'babysitting privileges revoked by
the counsellor of the Home pursuant to a report that the girl was
entertaining boyfriends while babysitting for the defendant, the girls
for the first time discussed their claimed experiences. Upon overhearing one of these discussions, the Home officials brought charges against
the defendant. The defendant elected to be tried without a jury and
was found guilty on two counts of rape and two counts of indecent
assault, but not guilty on the remaining three counts. On appeal, the
court reversed, holding that, particularly in view of the questionable
evidence against the defendant, the trial judge's repeated interruptions
and rebukes of defense counsel during cross-examination of the complaining witnesses could only have the effect of repressing counsel's
attack on their credibility and of giving aid and advice to the witnesses,
thereby denying defendant a fair trial. This reversal was obtained
notwithstanding the fact that the record showed defense counsel was
in some measure responsible for the colloquies with the trial judge.
In the past fifty years, rebuke of counsel has developed into a
conventional ground of appeal in both civil' and criminal 2 cases tried
before a jury. The decisions indicate that in order to obtain a reversal
21. E.g., Bischoff v. Rearick, 232 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1950) ; Parker v. Mazur, 13

S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1928).
1. See generally Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826 (1964).
2. See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 166 (1958).
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or a new trial, the party whose counsel was rebuked must prove that
his right to a fair trial was materially abridged by the rebukes. Such
abridgement has been found upon adducement of proof that the rebuke
caused one of the following effects: the jury was infected with the

judge's hostility toward counsel and construed the rebuke as adverse
comment on the merits of the defense,3 particularly in a close case which
might reasonably have gone the other way but for the conduct of the
court ;4 the rebuke of counsel was inextricably meshed with and aggravated other error in the case, most frequently undue interference with
the right of cross-examination ;5 the judge's strictures so handicapped
the attorney that the defendant was, in effect, deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, because the cowed attorney
diluted his efforts on his client's behalf for fear of further antagonizing
the judge.' That jury prejudice is by far the most compelling consideration to an appellate court confronted with this issue on review of a jury
trial is demonstrated by a number of cases in which the appeal failed
because the jury was unaware or absent when the incident occurred. 7
3. See, e.g., Gudger v. United States, 314 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (judge's
remarks might have influenced jury on question of credibility of witnesses) and
People v. Black, 150 Cal. App. 2d 494, 310 P.2d 472 (1957), ruling that the overall
effect of the many strictures upon counsel's way of presenting the case indicated an
obvious distrust of his motives and purposes which the jury could not miss. But see
Goldstein v. United States, 63 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1933), holding that an appellate
court should be slow to reverse a case for the alleged misconduct of the trial court,
unless it appears that the conduct complained of was intended or calculated to disparage the defendant in the eyes of the jury.
4. In Ash v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 125, 225 P.2d 816 (1950), the court said that
ordinarily such acts on the part of the court might not constitute reversible error,
yet where there is a doubt from a study of the entire record as to whether or not such
action prejudiced the rights of the defendant, such doubt will be resolved in favor
of the accused.
5. In People v. Burns, 109 Cal. App. 2d 524, 241 P.2d 308, 325 (1952), the
court stated: "Taking the sum total of the errors (no one of which, standing alone,
probably is sufficiently prejudicial to cause a reversal), coupled with the attitude of
the court throughout the trial, an examination of the transcript shows that defendant
was denied a fair trial;" accord, People v. Orosco, 73 Cal. App. 580, 239 P. 82
(1925), where the judge characterized the efforts of appellant's counsel as "iniquitous"
when the latter was seeking to impeach some of the witnesses of the prosecution,
refused proper instructions requested by appellant, and granted an instruction
requested by the prosecution which was improper; this conduct was held to demand
a reversal. But see Todorow v. United States, 173 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 925 (in the exercise of sound discretion the court may limit the
extent of cross-examination, and his action in that regard will not be reversed as
an abuse of discretion).
6. United States v. Kelley, 314 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1963), reversing the conviction where an attorney threatened with contempt did not recall witness for further
cross-examination probably because he did not know how to frame a question which
would meet the requirements as to admissibility imposed by the judge. Compare
Steinberg v. United States, 162 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 808 (1947),
affirming the conviction where counsel fined for contempt made no claim to be disconcerted and continued to conduct the trial with his accustomed vigor and skill, and
Magen v. United States, 24 F.2d 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 595 (1928),
stating that to hold that a personal altercation having no real relation to the merits
of the litigation causes a mistrial would be to reward a defendant for the shortcomings of his lawyer in a case where it is mere speculation to say he suffered any
prejudice. Contra, Fountain v. State, 23 Ga. App. 113, 98 S.E. 178, rev'd on other
grounds, 149 Ga. 519, 101 S.E. 294 (1918), where the court was of the opinion that
the trial judge may actually bring out attorney's dormant powers of eloquence and
thereby actually increase his effectiveness.
7. See, e.g., George v. United States, 266 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1958).
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The Gionfriddo decision is the first to hold harassment of counsel
reversible error in a non-jury criminal trial. Two earlier appeals of
criminal convictions in non-jury trials resulted in affirmances. s Of
five civil appeals, three were successful,' and two resulted in affirmance
of the lower courts' decision. 10 Absent the issue of jury prejudice, it
is clear that reversal or new trial will be granted only for aggravation
of other, more conventional error, or dilution of the attorney's efforts
such as amounts to deprivation of the assistance of counsel. The latter
ground is inherently weak because it is difficult to prove." The former
seems to offer somewhat better chance for success as demonstrated
by the principal case, where the conventional error compounded by
the judge's rebukes and interruptions was undue curtailment of the
right of cross-examination.' 2 A party urging either of these grounds,
however, must overcome several obstacles on the appellate level; a
reluctance to curtail the discretionary powers essential to the trial
judge's ability to conduct the proceedings properly and expeditiously ;1"
the fear that attorneys in hopeless cases will attempt to goad the trial
judge into misconduct in the hope of obtaining a new trial ;14 and the
presumption that the lower court did not abuse its authority nor base
its judgment on any but competent evidence. 15
There are no Maryland cases directly in point. There is some
indication in the cases, however, that the Maryland Court of Appeals
is not disposed to recognize rebuke of counsel as a ground for reversal,
even in a criminal case tried before a jury. 16 A presumption in favor
8. People v. Jorczak, 366 Ill. 507, 9 N.E.2d 227 (1937) ; State v. Frehner, 150
Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E.2d 868 (1948).
9. Home Ins. Co. v. Eggleston, 170 A.2d 781 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961);
Podlasky v. Price, 87 Cal. App. 2d 151, 196 P.2d 608 (1948), disapproved on other
grounds, Gague v. Bertram, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Adler v. Nelson,
123 Misc. 531, 205 N.Y.S. 336 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
10. Buckley v. Altheimer, 152 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum, 96 Cal. App. 2d 197, 214 P.2d 603 (1950).
11. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 830 (1958), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 901 (1958). The court considered
the colloquies complained of not sufficiently important to merit repetition and concluded that the defendants were in no way deprived of the effective assistance of
their counsel.
12. The court in Gionfriddo stated:
...a broad latitude on cross-examination must be allowed the defendant in
order to test the veracity of the witness.... In cases of this nature, in which
there are seldom eyewitnesses, a denial of the right of cross-examination or
undue interference by the court in the conduct of that examination, may seriously
curtail the legitimate and proper defense of one charged with the crime. It may
not be abrogated or abridged at the discretion of the court to the prejudice of the
cross-examining party. 221 A.2d at 854-55.
See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931), where the Court said:
f he extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of
inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court ....
But no obligation is
imposed on the court . . . to protect a witness from being discredited on crossexamination, short of an attempted invasion of his constitutional protection from
self-incrimination, properly invoked. 282 U.S. at 694.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 120 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1941).
14. People v. Westrup, 372 II1. 517, 25 N.E.2d 16, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 642
(1939) ; accord, People v. Malone, 205 App. Div. 257, 199 N.Y.S. 646 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
15. See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 63 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1933).
16. Schanker v. State, 208 Md. 15, 116 A.2d 363 (1955) (trial judge may express
dissent from counsel's statements as to the law in the course of a criminal trial);
Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955) (dictum - reversal not justified
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of the lower court's correctness is dictated by a rule of procedure"' and
fully reflected in the decisions.' s There is, at present, little reason to
believe that this presumption will be overcome except in those cases
where misconduct toward counsel causes or aggravates more conventional error or is so flagrant as to touch the conscience of the court. "

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - Injury Caused By Third
Party Tort-Feasor Need Not Arise Out Of Employment To Be
Compensable. Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160, 225 A.2d
431 (1967). The Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded
Gooch compensation for injuries sustained when he was shot on his
employer's premises shortly before working hours by Jones, who erroneously believed Gooch to be his wife's paramour. The Commission's
award was subsequently affirmed by both the circuit court and the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, which held that Gooch was entitled to
compensation even though his injury did not arise out of his employment but only occurred in the course thereof.
The court's decision, one of first impression," was based on a
statutory interpretation of Article 101, §§ 15 and 67(6) of the Maryland Code. Article 101, § 15 provides in part :2
Every employer subject to the provisions of this article, shall
pay or provide as required herein compensation according to the
schedules of this article for the disability or death of his employee
unless there is some clear showing that the trial judge's statements influenced the
jury against the accused). The Maryland court is unique in adopting the position
that rudeness on the part of the judge towards the attorney of the accused may
actually help him with the jury. The court in Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 59 A.2d
509 (1948), stated at p. 513: "Bar courtroom manners on the part of a judge do not
necessarily prejudice a man who is being tried before him. Sometimes they create
sympathy for him in the minds of the jury. A judge should at all times be impartial
and courteous and should not permit his personal feelings, if he has any, to be
exhibited before a jury, but unless there is some clear showing, which does not exist
in this case, that his words or his actions influenced the jury adversely to the appellant, the mere fact that the trial was conducted in an impatient and somewhat
peremptory way, does not justify a reversal." In Miemoth v. State, 160 Md. 544, 553,
154 A. 66, 70 (1931), the trial judge's statement that defendant's counsel could
... tell that to the Court of Appeals .... " when counsel argued in support of
exception was held not objectionable as revealing belief in defendant's guilt.
17. MD. R.P. 886. See also Rolling Inn, Inc. v. Iula, 212 Md. 596, 130 A.2d 758
(1957) ; Shapiro v. Marcus, 211 Md. 83, 124 A.2d 846 (1956).
18. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Cunningham, 162 Md. 698, 157 A. 896 (1932).
19. In Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 667-68, 59 A.2d 509, 512 (1948), the court said
by way of dictum: ".

.

. in a criminal case where grave error has been committed, and

the accused is thereby denied due process, an appellate court may and should, on its
own motion, reverse the conviction."
1. The decision squarely confronted the question which had been posed but left
unanswered in Maryland Paper Products Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 139 A.2d 219
(1958), where Judson's widow argued that § 68(6) - now § 67(6) - of Article 101
of the Maryland Code allowed recovery if the injury was suffered during the course
of employment, although not arising out of it. In Gooch, the court, citing Judson,
states: "[W]e there at least assumed that if the employee was in the course of his
employment when he was killed by a third person's negligence, his death was compensable even though it had not arisen out of the employment." 245 Md. at 167, 225
A.2d at 435.
2. MD. Comg ANN. art. 101, § 15 (1964 repl. vol.).

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

(VOL. XXVII

resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment ...
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accidental injury is defined in Article 101, § 67(6), which provides :'
"Injury," "personal injury," "accidental injury" and "accidental
personal injury" means only accidental injuries arising out of and
in the course of employment and such occupational disease or
infection as may naturally result therefrom . . . and includes an
injury caused by the wilful or negligent act of a third person
directed against an employee in the course of his employment.
The court stated that those two sections "must . . . be read together
and harmonized so as to give effect to the purpose of each" 4 and found
that § 67(6) created two new categories of compensable injuries: (1)
occupational diseases and infections which may be a natural result of
employment, and (2) injuries which occur during the course of employment, caused by third party tort-feasors.' In effect, the court has
read § 67(6) as amending § 15.
In addition to surmounting the hurdle that the legislature had not
chosen to amend § 15 in any obvious way, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland rejected the employer's argument that § 67(6) was intended by the legislature merely to include a wilful tort by a third
person in the definition of accidental injury, without removing the
requirement that the injury "aris[e] out of and in the course of employment." 6 Nothing in the paradoxical language of § 67(6) would
refute the employer's argument, since a literal interpretation of the
statute is impossible.' The court was thus faced with a choice of two
alternatives: (1) it could read into the latter part of § 67(6) an implied term that the injury must also arise out of employment to be
compensable, or (2) it could ignore the literal meaning of "includes"
and find that the final clause created a new, independent category of
compensable injuries. The court chose the second alternative and based
its decision on the legislative history of the statute and on the judicial
3. MD. Cong ANN. art. 101, § 67(6) (1964 repl. vol.).
4. Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160, 164, 225 A.2d 431, 433 (1967).
5, Id.
6. "[Iln the course of" has been defined by the court of appeals to mean "the
time, place and circumstances under which [an injury] occurs." Hill v. Liberty Motor
& Engineering Corp., 185 Md. 596, 605, 45 A.2d 467, 471 (1946) ; "arise out of"
has been defined as meaning that the injury "can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work, and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar
with the situation, as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment." Consolidated Engineering Co. v. Feikin, 188 Md. 420, 425, 52 A.2d 913, 916
(1947). See also Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 589-90, 212 A.2d 324,
326 (1965).
7. The paradox arises when one considers the literal language of this section.
The initial clause indicates that compensable injuries are "only [those] accidental
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment;" however, the language
following "includes" makes no mention of a requirement that compensable injuries must
"arise

out of" employment.
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construction of a similar clause in the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act :8
The term "injury" means accidental injury or death arising out
of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally . . . or unavoidably results

from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused by the
wilful act of a third person directed against an employee because
of his employment. 9
This clause is similar to the one in the original Senate Bill introduced
into the Maryland legislature.' ° The requirement of a causal relationship between the work and the injury, apparent in the original bill, did
not appear in the final version.
The fact that the original Senate Bill seemed to be patterned after
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act lends
considerable support to the Maryland court's assumption that its legislature intended to amend § 15, thus expanding the categories of compensable injuries by amending § 67(6). The section of the federal
act comparable to § 15 of the Maryland statute contains no limitation
to injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. Such
limitation in the federal act is found only in the definitional provision
quoted above. It can be argued that the Maryland legislature intended
to follow the federal scheme, as evidenced by its amendment patterned
after the federal definition, and that the federal scheme creates categories of compensable injuries by its definitional section. Furthermore,
it is only by such a reading of the Maryland statute that some meaning
can be given to the final phrase of § 67(6), "in the course of his
employment."
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo,1 the court, referring to the
clause of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
quoted above, stated: "Grammatically, this final clause of section 2(2)
is unqualified; it is not cumulative with but independent of, the statement in the first clause that 'injury' means accidental injury or death
arising out of and in the course of employment.' 1 2 The Gooch court
seized on this construction of the statute to find for the injured
employee.' 3
The court also analyzed the legislative history and the prior case
law and concluded that prior to 1951 an employee's injury caused by a
third party tort-feasor was not compensable unless it arose out of
as well as during the course of employment.' 4 The court stated that
8. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 902-50 (1964).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1964).
10. Ch.289, § 67(6), [1951] Laws of Maryland 751.
11. 107 F.2d 959 (D.C.Cir. 1939).
12. Id. at 961.
13. 245 Md. at 168-69, 225 A.2d at 435-36.
14. See, e.g., Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166
(1946) (employee killed on the job by a co-employee; recovery was denied because
the assault was motivated by a prior disagreement which was in no way work-connected) ; Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, 165 Md. 191, 167 A. 51 (1933) (employee
was on call at all times; recovery was allowed an employee who had gone to the
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it presumed the legislature enacted Chapter 289 of the Laws of 1952,
which is the present Article 101, § 67(6), with knowledge of the then
existing state of the law and concluded that it was reasonable to infer
that the legislature intended to "broaden the scope of the compensation
statute"' 5 to include injuries arising during, but not necessarily out
of, employment.
With Gooch, the court of appeals has aligned Maryland with a
growing minority of states that award compensation for injuries sustamined during a neutral assault.' 6 The liberality of the Gooch decision
is noteworthy when contrasted with Maryland's traditional, conservative, minority view that an accidental
injury must be more than an
7
unexpected result to be compensable.'
employer's premises and was struck by an automobile while returning home around
midnight) ; Todd v. Easton Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352, 128 A. 42 (1925) (night
watchman killed on duty by assailant seeking revenge, recovery was allowed). The
Todd court reasoned that a watchman exposes himself to peculiar risks which are
incident to his employment and deemed it immaterial that the assault was motivated
by personal desires for revenge. Id. at 356, 128 A. at 43-44.
15. 245 Md. at 165, 225 A.2d at 434.
16. See 1 A. LARsoN, WORscMSN'S COMP4NSATION § 11.31 (1966 ed.). Larson
divides assaults into three types: (1) work-connected, (2) privately motivated, and
(3) neutral, which includes assaults by mistake. See generally 6 W. SCHNIID-R,
WORKMZN'S COsPXNSA7ION § 1567(d) (perm. ed.); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 1254 (1938).
17. See, e.g., Mize v. Victor R. Beauchamp Associates, Inc., 245 Md. 583, 227
A.2d 5 (1967); Vaughan v. City of Baltimore, 229 Md. 547, 184 A.2d 842 (1962).
See also Note, "Accidental Means" in Workmen's Compensation, 18 MD. L. Rzv

131 (1958).

